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M O R A D  S A G H A F I From 11 January 2004, the day the list 
of acceptable candidates for the sev-
enth parliamentary elections was offi-
cially announced, until 2 February, the 
day that 126 legislators submitted their 
resignation to show their dissatisfac-
tion with the way these elections were 
taking place, the Guardian Council (GC) 
has taken the whole nation as hostage. 
The GC is a twelve-member body in charge of ensuring that laws voted 
in parliament are in accordance with the Constitution and Islamic prin-
ciples. Indeed, not only did the Council disqualify 44% (3533 out of 
8145) of the applicants, among them 80 incumbent parliamentarians, 
but it also effectively disregarded the intervention of the President of 
the Republic, the Speaker of Parliament, the National Security Council, 
and even the Leader. 
In effect, the intervention of the GC in the process of the elections 
constituted common practice especially after Ayatollah Khomeini’s 
passing from the scene. The height of these interventions however 
peaked in the last elections. In the past, the GC had disqualified 44% 
of the candidates during the 1996 parliamentary elections, and inter-
vened in the year 2000 elections by nullifying 700,000 voting ballots in 
Tehran, which corresponded to more than 20 % of the turnover in the 
capital. Thus, although the act in itself is not to be considered as an 
innovation, it could be seen, at least for three different reasons, as an 
original move. First is the extent of the disqualifications and the peo-
ple it concerned. Second, is the composition of the final alliance that 
made the disqualifications possible, and finally, the way the State was 
treated during the whole affair. How did a coup of this scale become 
possible? Who were its first and final protagonists? Finally, what are its 
consequences for Iran? 
Against all odds: the Guardian Council
The disqualification of a large number of candidates to the seventh 
parliamentary elections, including 80 incumbent legislators was im-
mediately followed by a sit-in by 140 legislators, and the threat of an 
election boycott by the two most important reformist political parties. 
The sit-in was also followed by the warning of resignation of all of the 
provincial governors (in charge of the organization of the elections in 
Iran), and few members of the presidential cabinet. 
To calm down the situation, the Security Council issued a commu-
niqué, announcing the creation of a three-member committee, com-
posed of the Defence Minister, the Information Minister and the Direc-
tor of Voice and Vision of the Islamic Republic of Iran, which is to find 
an honourable solution to the crisis.1 Unfortunately, neither the sit-in 
and the threats, nor the three-member committee were able to bend 
the GC’s decision. On 16 January, Ayatollah Khamenei, the Leader, con-
vened a high-level meeting to discuss the matter. The President, the 
Speaker of Parliament, and the Chairman of the GC participated in that 
meeting, the result of which seemed to be supportive of the reformists. 
The Leader pressed the GC to revise its position: “If you are in doubt, go 
by the previous decisions made in earlier cases by yourself and others. 
Assume the soundness and assume that those who had been elected 
previously were acceptable.” To make himself clear about the incum-
bent parliamentarians, he again came back on the issue and urged the 
GC to “act on what was previously accepted …the principle of accept-
ing the previous situation is correct. In my view, and as far as the Majlis 
deputies are concerned, it is possible 
to act on this basis.” Khamenei also em-
phasized that in any case the rejection 
had to be justified by proof.
Nevertheless, the GC did not entirely 
yield: although 1160 previously dis-
qualified prospective candidates were 
re-instated, only three incumbent leg-
islators saw their candidacy re-estab-
lished. Later on, in an open letter published in two daily newspapers, 
the parliamentarians whose candidacies were rejected questioned the 
council’s defiance of the leader’s order. The letter asked suggestively if 
the GC had not privately received from the Leader himself the authori-
zation to insist on the disqualifications.2 
While the existence of the Leader’s secret approval of the GC’s deci-
sion could provide the simplest explanation for the council’s insistence 
on its position, it seems rather improbable that the Leader would have 
accepted to ridicule himself publicly by making a clear proclamation in 
favour of the incumbent legislators as seen previously. Moreover, the 
Leader’s office has been particularly useful in Iran’s political arena in ar-
bitrating the controversies between different factions. By accepting—
covertly—the elimination of one faction, while publicly defending its 
existence he would significantly weaken his own political position. This 
is actually the reason he intervened so clearly on behalf of maintaining 
the incumbent legislators’ candidacies. Hence, the explanation for the 
council’s unyielding position has to be sought elsewhere.
Ending the reform and its legal basis
By disqualifying the candidacy of 80 incumbent legislators, the GC 
showed its will to put an end to the reform movement. This decision 
was most likely taken when the Iranian population showed its dissat-
isfaction with the reform movement by not voting for the reformist 
candidates during the second election for local councils, held less than 
a year earlier. In fact, at the opening of the seventh parliamentary elec-
tions campaign, the reform movement was at its lowest level of popu-
larity. The time was most favourable to put a conclusive end not only to 
the reform movement, but also to the electoral system that was respon-
sible for creating such a movement: an electoral system that although 
not fully democratic, but open enough to allow individuals from within 
the inner circle of the Islamic Republic to openly challenge it. 
In this battle there was no room for any arbitration: everyone had 
to choose the council’s side. For the same reason, a few days after the 
GC refused to acknowledge the Leader’s recommendation, the two 
most eminent chiefs of the reform movement, i.e. the President and 
the Speaker of the Parliament, went to the GC headquarter for a final 
round of negotiations. Though the content of the negotiations was left 
unknown, the declaration that followed the meeting showed that both 
sides stood by their respective positions. Ayatollah Jannati, the GC’s 
Chair declared that the President and the Speaker were convinced of 
the appropriateness of the GC’s disqualifications, a claim which the 
government denied immediately. The government in turn announced 
(via its spokesman) its refusal to organize a non-free election, and ac-
cordingly asked the Leader to intervene once again. While it was clear 
that both sides were bluffing, by deferring to the Leader, the govern-
ment showed its limitations in this last round of a seven-year struggle 
against the conservatives. On the contrary, by refusing the Leader’s de-
mand to reintegrate the incumbent legislators into the process of elec-
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tions, the GC showed its determination 
to overcome any obstacle along its way 
to achieve its end. 
Shall it be concluded that a blatant 
political error occurred on the part of 
the government? Was there a miscalcu-
lation as to who defines the rules of the 
game in the Islamic Republic of Iran’s 
political scene? By reviewing Khatami’s 
seven-year record, the answer to both 
questions is rather negative. Actually, 
what Khatami did in this final round 
was in full accordance with what he did 
during his previous two presidential 
terms, which was to abide by the Con-
stitution. The Constitution gives the 
highest responsibility to the Leader. For 
the same reason, after the resignation 
of 126 parliamentarians and when the 
two most important reformist politi-
cal formations declared their refusal to 
participate in the upcoming elections, 
Khatami did nothing but write a letter 
to the Leader, asking for the deferment 
of the elections. Again, in the same line 
of thought, when the Leader advised 
him not to postpone the elections, he 
yielded to the Leader’s will, giving the 
Interior Ministry the order to prepare 
the elections for 20 February.
The absence of reform supporters
Had the popular supporters of the reform movement stood up more 
determinedly than they had done during the 22 days of the parliamentar-
ians’ sit-in, the GC could not have stood so irrevocably in its position. In 
reality, despite several appeals from the parliamentarians who occupied 
the Parliament for more than three weeks, no serious backing came from 
the society. The day after the sit-in started, in a communiqué, the 126 par-
liamentarians joined by a few other well-known reformist figures called 
upon “the intellectuals, academics, students, teachers, and finally all the 
enlightened and clear-sighted people to understand the seriousness of 
the situation and to take the responsibility befallen upon them.”3 How-
ever, nothing happened. Even students who were in the forefront of the 
fight against the conservatives during the last seven years took their time 
in issuing a few ambivalent communiqués. 
The students of Daftar-e Tahkim-e Vahdat (the most powerful student 
union and the closest to the reform movement) acknowledged the cour-
age of the parliamentarians, but also criticized them for having lost the 
confidence of the 30 million people who had brought them to power by 
waiting seven years before taking such brave actions.4 In fact, the eupho-
ria of the 1997 presidential elections was gone for good, and a bitter feel-
ing of having been betrayed had already replaced it. As one research has 
recently remarked, Khatami’s election was expected to turn the Islamic 
Republic’s adversaries into the loyal opposition, and the ongoing opposi-
tion was to be transformed into supporters. What happened after seven 
years of quasi-continuous setting back of Khatami in every subject that 
opposed him to the conservative forces? A large number of his support-
ers now oppose the idea of a possible reform from within the framework 
of the actual Constitution of the Islamic Republic, and political forces that 
wanted to act as the loyal opposition are now acting as open adversar-
ies.5 Indeed, the Student Union of Amir Kabir University (the second most 
important student union of the country), while praising the bravery of 
the parliamentarians, asked if the real point of debate is not whether the 
actual Constitution gives a real possibility of reform.6
The international dynamic
Contrary to the American Government which following the adoption 
of the “double containment (i.e. containing both Iraq and Iran) policy”, 
cut off its economic relations with Iran, the European Community de-
cided to follow on what they called the “critical dialogue.” In this re-
spect, the election of a reformist candidate—M. Khatami—in 1997 as 
President of the Republic became a blessing for the political line cho-
sen by European countries toward Iran. Seven years later, the reform 
movement was caught up in endless fights between factions and no 
significant progress was made neither on the field of civil liberties nor 
in the economic area. Moreover, there was no clarification regarding 
the responsibilities of the different government offices, preventing Eu-
rope from having a unique negotiating Iranian partner. The confused 
situation in Afghanistan and Iraq, created by the American invasion, 
and the world concern about the Middle East nuclear proliferation, 
convinced the European countries that having a unique negotiating 
partner in Iran is more important than standing up for the cause of 
reform in Iran. This is why after a few shy critiques addressed to Iran 
for holding non-democratic elections, the European community kept 
quiet and joined the ever-enlarging cluster of those who believe that 
the reform movement is not worth the backing.
While the reform movement which started with the 1997 elections 
that brought Mohammad Khatami to power did not fulfill any of its 
engagements, it however produced one big change in the way poli-
tics was practised in the Islamic Republic of Iran: elections became the 
most important place where the struggle for power had to occur. It was 
for stopping the expansion of the electoral process as the centre of 
Iran’s political system and thus preventing it from becoming the pri-
mary tool for the creation of political authority that the conservative 
forces, guided by the GC, disqualified more than 
40% of the candidates, among them 80 incum-
bent legislators. With a weakened reform move-
ment opposing them, and an international com-
munity urging to negotiate with a unique central 
authority in Iran, the moment was opportune to 
strike a fatal blow at the electoral system. 
By fiercely opposing the reform movement dur-
ing seven years, the conservatives reached their 
aim of annihilating it. The question is no longer 
whether the political situation of the country could 
be improved through a reform, or whether Iran will 
need a constitutional change. The answer is clear: 
nobody wants the reform anymore. With the blow 
struck at the electoral process, the question is now 
whether the agents of change will continue looking 
at it as a means to create change or whether they 
will seek other means to this end.
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